

~~SECRET~~

May 13, 2003 5:14 PM

Principles for Iraq—Policy Guidelines

1. **Global significance.** It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Coalition success in Iraq. If Iraq, with its size, capabilities and resources, is able to move to a path of representative democracy, the impact in the region and the world could be historic—with good effects on Iranians, Syrians, Palestinians and others. Iraq could conceivably become a model—an example that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremism taking place in the Muslim world.
2. **Supporting President Bush's vision for a free Iraq.** The Coalition will seek out and support Iraqis desiring to participate in their country's future, to the extent they support the vision of a free Iraq. Those who do not will be opposed. Iraq will:
 - be a single country;
 - not have weapons of mass destruction;
 - not be a terrorist state and not harbor terrorists;
 - not be a threat to its neighbors or to diverse elements within Iraq;
 - have a market economy and an independent judiciary; and
 - have respect for the rule of law, for ethnic and religious minorities, for the rights of women, and be on a path to representative democratic government.
3. **Assert authority, provide security.** The Coalition Provisional Authority will assert authority over the country—a country that has been a dictatorship for decades. It will not accept being defied—it will not accept or tolerate self-appointed "leaders." Among the immediate objectives will be restoration of law and order for the Iraqi people and provision of essential services. The Coalition will be ready to use force to impose order as required. Without security for the Iraqi people, none of their goals will be achievable.
4. **Commitment to stay; commitment to leave.** The Coalition will maintain as many security forces in Iraq—U.S. and Coalition—as necessary, for as long as necessary, to accomplish the stated goals, and no longer.

Declassified by Policy Declassification Team IAW EO12958 June 22, 2007

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

5. Unity of leadership. There will be clarity that the Coalition is in charge, with no conflicting signals to the Iraqi people, Coalition partners or neighbors. Success requires that there be unambiguous unity of leadership and effort.
6. Exploitation of intelligence. The exploitation of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and intelligence efforts in or affecting Iraq will be aggressive and coordinated among the Military Commander, the Presidential Envoy and the intelligence community.
7. Iraqi foreign missions. The Coalition will gain control over Iraqi foreign embassies and, to the extent possible, Iraqi seats in international fora.
8. Improve conditions; involve Iraqis. The Coalition will work energetically to improve the circumstances of the Iraqi people. It will work to achieve rapid and visible accomplishments in vital public services for the Iraqi people, and create an environment that encourages the involvement of the Iraqi people, for it is their responsibility to build the future of their country.
9. Promote Iraqis who share coalition's goals. In staffing ministries and positioning Iraqis in ways that will increase their influence, the Coalition will work to have acceptable Iraqis involved as early as possible, so Iraqi voices can explain the goals and direction to the Iraqi people. Only if Iraqis are seen as being engaged in, responsible for, and explaining and leading their fellow citizens will broad public support develop that is essential for security. Regardless of what the Coalition does, however, Iraqi Interim Authority will be viewed generally as the Coalition's creation. Therefore, we will accept that fact, get on with the task and work to help make sure it succeeds.
10. Hands-on political reconstruction. As the political process proceeds, the Coalition will consistently steer the process to achieve the stated objectives. The Coalition will not "let a thousand flowers bloom."
11. De-Baathification. The Coalition will work with forward-looking Iraqis and actively oppose the old regime's enforcers—the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, etc.—and make clear that it will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime.
12. Justice for criminals. Those who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity on the old regime's behalf will be tracked down and brought to justice. Mechanisms will be established to detain and screen out members of organizations that carried out the regime's repression and bring them to justice. De-Baathification may cause some inefficiencies, but it is necessary to remove pervasive fear from Iraqi society.

~~SECRET~~

Declassified by Policy Declassification Team IAW EO12958 June 22, 2007



~~SECRET~~

13. Repairing the social fabric. Iraq will need to find ways to heal the wounds that the Baathists inflicted on the society. The experiences of Eastern Europe and elsewhere could inform that process.
14. Property claims. Mechanisms will be established to adjudicate property claims peacefully.
15. Favor market economy. Decisions will favor market systems, not Stalinist command systems, and activities that will diversify the Iraqi economy beyond oil. The Coalition will move to privatize state-owned enterprises.
16. Pay smart. The Coalition will protect against the distortion of the economy by excessive payments from international organizations, NGOs and others.
17. Oil. Iraqi oil will be used and marketed for the Iraqi people. The Coalition Provisional Authority, based on a study of best practices around the world, will develop a plan for the Iraqi oil industry based on transparency and private ownership, designed to benefit the Iraqi people.
18. Contracts—promoting Iraq's recovery. Contracts for work in Iraq will go to those who use Iraqi workers and to countries that supported the Iraqi people's liberation, especially neighbors such as Jordan and the Gulf states, so as to contribute to greater regional economic activity and to accelerate Iraq's economic recovery.
19. Coalition and international organizations. Other countries and international organizations, including the UN, will be encouraged to assist in Iraq, but their presence should be designed to further a difficult task, not to complicate it.
20. Outsiders—assistance, but not interference. Assistance from neighbors will be welcomed. Conversely, interference in Iraq by its neighbors or others in the international community will not be accepted. Iraqis who are complicit, or for example serve as agents of Iranian or Syrian influence, will be dealt with.
21. Monitoring NGOs. NGO assistance is welcomed and encouraged, but activities of NGOs will be monitored and regulated, to exclude those with extremist ties.
22. Priority sources of funds. The U.S. will be the funder of last resort, not first. In order of preferred expenditure: Iraqi funds located in Iraq, Iraqi funds in the UN Oil-for-Food program, seized frozen Iraqi assets in the U.S. and other countries, and donors from other nations. The reality is that once the U.S.

~~SECRET~~

Declassified by Policy Declassification Team IAW EO12958 June 22, 2007



~~SECRET~~

funds an activity, it will be difficult to get others to take over that responsibility. The urgency of the problem should serve to raise money from others.

23. Trial and error. Democracies in transition are inherently untidy. Trial and error and experimentation will be part of the process. It will not be perfect. Course corrections should be expected.
24. New matters. Additional issues will be addressed as they surface (the role of the UN, debt relief, etc.).
25. Current coalition. Attached is a list of nations that have assisted or are in the process of assisting in Iraq.
26. Patience and respect for Iraq's singular character. The transition from despotism to a democracy will not happen easily or fast. It cannot be rushed—it will likely evolve over years. Further, the ultimate outcome must be decided by the Iraqi people, within the broad principles laid out by President Bush. One ought not expect the Iraqi outcome to replicate any other system. For example, there may well be a larger role for religion than in many other democratic countries. Rushing elections could lead to tyranny of the majority. Elections will likely best be held only after the mechanisms of a civil society are in place.

Attach.

List of nations

DIRR dh
Iraq/Principles for Iraq

~~SECRET~~

